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]RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
STATE BOARD AGAINST DISCRIMINATION: ORDER TO
HIRE AS AN AUTHORIZED REMEDY
The Washington State Board Against Discrimination processed a
complaint filed by Mrs. Geraldine Arnett charging defendant hospital
with refusing to accept her application for employment as tray girl
because of her Negro race. Investigation by the board substantiated
Mrs. Arnett's charge of racial discrimination, but informal negotiation
between the board and defendant failed to yield a satisfactory solution.
The board then held a formal hearing, found defendant in violation of
the Law Against Discrimination,1 and ordered it to accept Mrs. Arnett's
application and offer her employment in the first vacant position for
tray girl, providing she met the standard qualification for that position.
Defendant petitioned the superior court for review. The court modified
the board's order by retaining the provision requiring acceptance of
Mrs. Arnett's application but deleting the provision requiring an offer
of employment. Seeking to reinstate its order in full, the board ap-
pealed to the Washington Supreme Court, which reversed and re-
manded. Held: The Washington State Board Against Discrimination
can order an employer of unskilled labor to hire an applicant, against
whom the employer has discriminated on the basis of race, when the
position subsequently becomes vacant, provided the applicant meets
the normal qualifications for the position. Arnett v. Seattle General
Hospital, 65 Wash. Dec. 2d 1, 395 P.2d 503 (1964).
The Washington Law Against Discrimination is an exercise of the
state's police power designed to eliminate discrimination in employment
and public accommodations. The statute establishes a Board Against
Discrimination with authority to receive and investigate complaints,
and to dispose of them by dismissal, "conciliation," or formal order
pursuant to hearing.2 The board may order a party in violation of the
act to "cease and desist from such unfair practice and to take such
affirmation action, including, (but not limited to) hiring.., or ... such
'WASH. REv. CODE ch. 49.60 (1958).
2 Board hearings are conducted before three-man hearing tribunals composed of
board members and members of a hearing panel selected by the board. The tribunal
issues orders without board review. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 162-08-005 (1)-(2), 007;
WASH. Rav. CoDE § 49.60.250 (1958).
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other action, as, in the judgment of the tribunal, will effectuate the pur-
poses of this Chapter .... "I The limits of this broad statutory power
are unclear, as is the question whether a hiring order constitutes re-
verse discrimination, thereby violating the equal protection provisions
of the Constitution.
The court in the principal case noted that the board issued its order
after having reasonably inferred that, if defendant were required only
to accept complainant's application for employment, discrimination
would persist. The court reserved the question whether power would
have existed were "unusual talents" required for the position.' In
stating the scope of judicial review, the court said:
It is the well-established law in this state, as well as in other jurisdic-
tions, that modifications of administrative orders by a court of review
are limited to acts that are arbitrary or capricious, or where the tribunal
proceeded on a fundamentally wrong basis, or beyond its power under
the statute."
The court found that the superior court had violated these principles
by substituting its judgment for the board's as to what remedial action
was appropriate. The majority declined to consider constitutional
issues, holding that they had not been properly raised. Chief Justice
Ott, dissenting, argued that to order the hospital to hire complainant
upon condition she met "standard qualifications," without regard to
whether other applicants might be-more qualified, is in itself discrimi-
natory, and violates equal protection.
Arnett gave the Washington Supreme Court an opportunity to define
the power of the Board Against Discrimination, and to clarify the
court's responsibility in reviewing board action. The court's analysis,
however, leaves in doubt the meaning of review principles by failure
to recognize the Washington Administrative Procedure Act as the
statutory basis for judicial review of board action.6 The court did
point out the proper standard for review of discretionary board action
to be whether it is "arbitrary or capricious," but failed to delimit the
area in which the board may exercise its discretion.
3 WAsu. REv. CODE § 49.60.250 (1958).
'65 Wash. Dec. 2d at 5, 395 P.2d at 505.5 Id. at 8, 395 P.2d at 507.
6 The court drew its review standards from 2 Am Jus. (SEcoND) Administrative
Law § 672 (1962). Although the APA includes essentially these same standards, it
does not empower the superior court to modify board orders. WAsH. REV. CODE §
34.04.130 (1959). The applicability of the APA is settled by WAsH. REV. CODE §
34.04.910 (1959) ; Herrett Truckifig Co. v. Washington Pub. Serv. Conmn'n, 58 Wn. 2d
542, 364 P2d 50$ (1961).
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A great amount of the difficulty facing the court in Arnett came from
the language of the Law Against Discrimination permitting the board
"to take other such action as, in the judgment of the tribunal, will
effectuate the purposes of this chapter."' This delegation of power is
so unconstrained by standards that it would not have been inappropri-
ate had the court declared it unconstitutionally vague. But the court
did not handle the power question effectively. In finding that the
statutory provision empowering the board to effectuate the purpose of
the act made a hiring order appropriate when complainant's applica-
tion had not been accepted, it is unclear whether the court reasoned
that the act was being effectuated by eliminating discrimination against
complainant, or by using complainant to break down defendant's pat-
tern of discrimination.8 Either securing employment for complainant
or eliminating a pattern of discrimination could be construed as the
effectuation of a policy of preventing discrimination, but the signifi-
cance of each in terms of board power differs. Further, consideration
of other possible uses of the board power to take action which, in the
board's judgment, "effectuates the purpose of the [act]" raises such
questions as whether the board could have, (a) ordered the defendant
to hire a Negro, other than complainant, chosen by the board, or, (b)
ordered complainant hired without an existing vacancy, or, (c) re-
quired defendant to retain complainant had she been hired and subse-
quently discharged in favor of a more qualified candidate.
The court is now faced with judicially defining the implied limits of
the board's power to take any action effectuating the purposes of the
Law Against Discrimination. Three considerations are relevant to this
process-first, the forms of relief available to the board; second, the
purposes of the Law Against Discrimination for which remedial meas-
ures are to be taken; third, the degree to which the board may investi-
gate and take remedial action beyond the limits of the complaint which
initiates board action. The problem of available forms of relief will
probably be answered by finding the board limited to use of those forms
which are available to a court of equity; there seems no more appro-
priate standard. The court in Arnett reserved the question whether the
board would have power to issue a hiring order were unusual talents
required for the position, suggesting reliance upon a standard of
WASH. RFv. CODE § 49.60.250 (1958).8 Complainant's personal interests and the public interest are distinct, and frequently
in conflict. See Note, The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of
Antidiscrimination Legislation, 74 HARv. L. REv. 526 (1961).
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equitable remedies. The problem of fulfillment of the purposes of the
Law Against Discrimination, for which board action is to be taken,
mainly concerns the degree to which the board-asserting remedial
relief after processing a complaint-may be guided by what benefits
the overriding public interest in non-discrimination rather than what
satisfies the complainant. Arnett leaves this uncertain, for, while the
complainant may have secured a cease and desist order in a civil
action,' it is not shown how the purpose of the Law Against Discrimi-
nation was effectuated by allowing the board to take the additional
step of ordering complainant hired. The problem of the scope of
board action upon receipt of a complaint is partially answered in the
Law Against Discrimination. The board's extensive power to investi-
gate complaints,"0 to amend complaints," to issue its own complaints, 2
and to argue complaints before the tribunal, 3 and the tribunal's re-
sponsibility to find any unfair practice and take remedial action to
effectuate the act's purpose, 4 authorizes board action much broader
than vindication of complainant's personal rights. It is unclear,
though, how far the board's investigation and action may go in uncov-
ering and litigating unfair practices unrelated to filed complaints.
The constitutionality of employment provisions in the Law Against
Discrimination, and of hiring orders issued pursuant to it, was not
considered by the majority in Arnett because the issue had not been
properly raised. The dissent, contending that constitutionality of the
law should have been reviewed before the act was enforced, argued
that the board order violated equal protection. 5 The argument in dis-
sent accepts anti-discrimination legislation as a valid police power
measure," and hiring orders as valid remedial actions,' but reasons
that hiring orders used to benefit the public welfare, rather than pro-
tect private rights, discriminate in reverse by requiring employment of
particular persons identifiable by unreasonable classifications. The
dissent implied that the order to hire in Arnett was no different than if
the board had ordered defendant to hire a Negro. While the reverse
discrimination argument usually deals with legislative provision or gov-
9 For an example of a civil action for discrimination see Browning v. Slenderella
Systems of Seattle, 54 Wn. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959).10 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.120, .140, and .240 (1958)
"I WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.250 (1958).
'2 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.230(2) (1958).
13 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.250 (1958)
14 Ibid
35 65 Wash. Dec. 2d at 10, 395 P.2d at 508 (Ott, C. J., dissenting).
10 See Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
'. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
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ernmental action which gives operative effective to a classification of
persons defined by race or color, the Law Against Discrimination uses
the classification of "persons discriminated against." The difference is
evident, for the latter classification--dealing with persons whose rights
have been violated-is arguably a more valid object of governmental
action in light of equal protection requirements than is a classification
based upon race or color. This suggests the corollary argument implied
in the Arnett dissent that, although the Law Against Discrimination
meets substantive equal protection requirements, board action pur-
suant to the act, if motivated by consideration of complainant's race or
color, would violate procedural equal protection. 8 While it is incum-
bent upon the court to determine the basis of board action, there was
no evidence in Arnett that the board issued its affirmative hiring order
because complainant was a Negro.'
Arnett is the third case to reach the Washington Supreme Court
under the Law Against Discrimination,"0 and is only an early effort to
formulate a framework for judicial review of board action. Most con-
stitutional issues under the act have been settled; future cases will pre-
sent problems in board authority and the scope of judicial review. The
fair employment provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" will un-
doubtedly promote application to similar state commissions by inducing
a higher consciousness of discriminatory practices and by attracting to
the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaints
which, under the provisions of the act, must be turned over to state
commissions for initial processing. 2 Cases from other jurisdictions,
like Arnett, have shown judicial inclination to favor broad discretion
in human rights commissions."3 Such deference must continue if com-
missions are to maintain effective administrative flexibility.
1' Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
19 Note, however, that this analysis requires an understanding of how the board
comprehends the purposes of the Law Against Discrimination. If the board in Arnett
had ordered defendant to hire complainant as a measure to end a pattern of discrimi-
nation against Negroes, it would be arguable whether the governmental action was
taken to benefit Negroes or to benefit persons discriminated against.
20 O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination, 58 Wn. 2d 793, 365
P.2d 1 (1961), held unconstitutional the fair housing provision, WAsH. REv. CODE §
49.60.030(3) (1958) ; Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination v. Interlake
Realty, Inc., 62 Wn. 2d 928, 385 P2d 37 (1963), affirmed an order to appear before
the board.
2178 Stat. 253-266, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2000e-15 (1964).
22 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(c) (1964).
23 E.g., International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Commission on Civil Rights,
140 Conn. 537, 102 A.2d 366 (1953) ; Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E2d 581
(Ct App. 1954).
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